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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Essay is to bring an "anti-essentialist" and "re-
productive health" perspective to the public policy debate concerning
pregnancy-related regulations, including, but not limited to, abortion
regulations. It will attempt to create a gender-based equal protection
framework that is attentive to the ways in which U.S. reproductive
health policies impact on one particular subgroup of women-
adolescents.
My desire to describe the possibilities within contemporary equal
protection doctrine is, in part, a personal desire to respond to some of my
critics. In previous articles, I have suggested that we need to turn to
equal protection arguments to make persuasive pro-choice arguments
rather than privacy arguments' to gain the higher moral ground on the
* Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. I would like to thank my research
assistant at Tulane University, Joyce Cain, for her extremely diligent research and assistance. I
would also like to thank Professor Rebecca Cook at the University of Toronto, and the Alan
Guttmacher Institute for their helpful bibliographic suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Ni-
tya Duclos, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law, for provid-
ing me with very useful constructive criticisms on an earlier draft and for helping me better
understand the anti-essentialism critique. I thank Tulane Law School for the C.J. Morrow Research
professorship under which I was able to write this Essay.
Despite the rules of A Uniform System of Citation, I have retained the first name of the authors
that I cite in this Essay because those names often gender-identify the authors, and I believe that the
author's gender is relevant to her perspective. In addition, where the author retains her birth name
as a middle name, I also try to include her birth name. I follow this practice out of respect for
women's desire to increase control over their own naming, although I recognize the fact that a
woman's birth name often becomes her middle name, upon marriage, is itself a reflection of women's
lack of control over their naming. I also have provided the first names of authors of both books and
articles, not wanting to prioritize books over articles (as is conventional under A Uniform System of
Citation).
1. I do not object to us making a privacy argument in the alternative, as long as it is also
accompanied by an equal protection argument, because I do recognize that certain aspects of the
abortion decision are compatible with a privacy perspective. For example, arguments concerning the
right of women to have access to the contraceptive RU 486 could be grounded in an individually-
based liberty/privacy argument as well as an equal protection argument. A liberty/privacy argu-
ment would emphasize the right of each individual to make informed decisions about appropriate
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abortion issue. I have been criticized for not fully sketching out that
equal protection framework.2 This Essay will respond to those criticisms
by showing how feminists can make a persuasive equal protection argu-
ment concerning reproductive issues that is respectful of life in all of its
various forms.
In this Introduction, Part I, I define what I mean by an "anti-essen-
tialist" and "reproductive health perspective" and briefly discuss how
these perspectives would enhance the discussion of pregnancy-related
regulations. In Part II, I summarize the magnitude of the problem of
unintended pregnancies and early childbirth in the United States, focus-
ing on female adolescents. Because I do not believe it is possible to talk
readily about the problem of unintended pregnancies as if it is exper-
ienced by all women in the same way, I focus my attention on one sub-
class of women-adolescents. And because I realize that even the wo-
men in this sub-class do not form a monolithic unit, I try to describe how
their lives are affected by the variables of race and class. I then examine
how our social and legislative policies respond to reproductive health is-
sues by discussing: (1) contraception and sex education; (2) prenatal
care; (3) abortion; and (4) adoption. I argue that, at each stage, our so-
cial policies act coercively on the lives of adolescent females in a way that
is detrimental to their health, as well as the health of their fetus and
future children. Based on this empirical discussion, I then conclude that
our legislatures have consistently demonstrated an appalling disrespect
for the value of the lives of pregnant adolescent females. I argue that this
evidence demonstrates how important it is for the courts to examine re-
productive health legislative policies with the utmost scrutiny to insure
that we protect the health and well-being of adolescent females who often
do not have the power to vote to influence political decisions.
In Part III of this Essay, I apply the previous discussion to law by
describing my proposed equal protection framework for challenging re-
productive health policies that hurt female adolescents. One issue in the
constitutional debate over abortion has been a controversy concerning
medical treatment. An equal protection framework would emphasize that women are not simply
being treated as individuals, whose liberty interests are being disregarded by being denied access to
RU 486, but women also are being denied protection of their liberty interest in a group-based way.
Women as a class are denied access to RU 486 (and other contraceptive technology that is available
in Europe) as part of their systematic disrespectful treatment by society in relation to their reproduc-
tive capacity. Thus, the argument can be expressed in privacy or in equal protection terms, but I
believe that the equal protection argument more fully captures the significance of the denial of access
to contraceptive technology.
2. See Sarah Bums, Notes From the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 189, 201 (1990) ("Professor Colker raises the equality issue as if it were a new idea not explored
by other feminists.").
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the appropriate level of scrutiny that the court should apply in assessing
the constitutionality of these kinds of legislative policies. The Supreme
Court appears to be moving toward a heightened rationality standard,
under privacy doctrine, that is less rigorous than the standard used in
Roe v. Wade 3 and that is also less rigorous than the standard employed
under equal protection analysis for sex-based classifications. 4 I hope that
this Essay will help persuade some people that reproductive health legis-
lation that affects female adolescents deserves the highest level of scru-
tiny, and that scrutiny should not be limited to parental consent or
notification statutes that target adolescents. All of our reproductive
health policies dramatically affect female adolescents, irrespective of
whether the legislature focused on adolescents when it enacted the
legislation.
A. Anti-Essentialism
Gender essentialism is "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' wo-
men's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience."5 It is exem-
plified in the work of many feminist academicians, 6 who, when we are
allegedly talking about an issue's impact on "women," have, in fact, been
talking about its impact on white, middle-class women.7 Through foot-
notes or parentheticals, we have often noted the impact on poor, adoles-
cent, women of color. An anti-essentialist perspective, however, points
out that the parentheticals and footnotes only made it clear that women,
unmodified, in fact meant white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual,
3. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
4. See, ag., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (asking whether the classification serves
"important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives").
5. Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585
(1990).
6. The feminists who are often cited as fitting into this category include Catharine MacKinnon
and Robin West. However, I would include some of my own work in this category. See, eg., Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above Ali" Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003
(1986) (attempting to describe women's subordination in universal terms). Thus, I use the pronoun
"we" in discussing feminists to whom the anti-essentialism critique applies.
7. See generally ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT ix (1988) ("[Western feminist thought] expresses and reinforces the privilege of
white middle-class women"); Nitya Duclos, Lessons of Difference" Feminist Theory on Cultural DI-
versity, 38 BUFFALO L. REv. 325, 374 (1990) (referring to "renegotiated feminism"); Nitya Duclos,
Same Sex Marriaga" Complicating the Question, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY
LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1991) (referring to the "anti-essentialist" stance); Angela Harris, supra
note 5, at 608-16 (referring to "post-essentialism"); Maria C. Lugones & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Have
We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Wo-
man's Voice,' 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INT. F. 573 (1983) (suggesting non-ethnocentric theories).
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adult women. As Angela Harris has noted, this tendency did not make
all feminists who wrote from an essentialist perspective "racist."" Our
awareness of the need to observe the impact of policies specifically on
women of color, for example, was based on an appropriate race-con-
scious sensitivity. Nevertheless, our general discussions of "women"
with parentheticals concerning African-American or Hispanic women
did not go far enough toward race-conscious sensitivity. An anti-essen-
tialist perspective would be more careful in describing "women," em-
bracing the important differences that exist among women.
The anti-essentialism critique is not directed only at feminist acade-
micians. Many academic and political discussions of various issues suffer
from the problem of essentialism. For example, the abortion debate, as
reflected in both pro-choice and pro-life writings, has often been overly
superficial and general in its description of how women are affected by
various reproductive choices,9 thereby suffering from a problem of essen-
tialism. The variables of race, age, sexual orientation, handicap, religion,
and social class affect how various reproductive decisions influence wo-
men's lives. Nevertheless, the abortion debate tends to focus on all "wo-
men" as if they are a monolithic category. Recently, it has become
fashionable to discuss the "problem of teenage pregnancy," but even this
more focused discussion is unsatisfactory because it fails to reflect that
pregnancy does not affect all adolescents 0 in the same way. Finally, the
popularity of the abortion debate is a reflection of the problem of essen-
tialism because this debate chooses one issue for debate-abortion-and
generally ignores the larger and more complex problems relating to re-
productive health issues, of which pregnancy is only one part.
One source to help us move beyond the problem of essentialism in
the abortion debate is the empirical literature on reproductive health is-
sues that concerns adolescents ranging from contraception to post-natal
8. Angela Harris, supra note 5, at 585.
9. See, eg., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)
(disagreeing with Roe decision); CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
(1987) (pro-choice); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (disagreeing with Roe decision). A somewhat more sensitive account of the
abortion issue is provided by Rosalind Petchesky. See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABOR-
TION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1984)
(discussing history, practice, and politics). However, Petchesky does not discuss adolescents until
page 200, and then does so only in universal terms-describing teenagers as if they are a monolithic
group.
10. I use the phrase "adolescent pregnancy" rather than "teenage pregnancy" in this Essay to
emphasize that some girls become pregnant before arriving at their teenage years. I also do not use
the phrase "juvenile pregnancy" because that phrase sounds derogatory. The phrase "adolescent
pregnancy" seems to have the fewest negative connotations of the various phrases that I have heard




care. Because of the rigorous nature of this literature and the broad
range of its considerations, it can help us break down some of the univer-
salist categories about women that are prevalent in abortion and preg-
nancy-related discussions. I therefore turn to explaining what I mean by
a "reproductive health perspective" and how it can help us to better un-
derstand the phenomenon of adolescent pregnancy and abortion.
B. Reproductive Health Perspective
The abortion debate has not represented a reproductive health per-
spective. In the cases and literature, it often sounds as though women
find themselves pregnant without ever engaging in sexual behavior or us-
ing contraceptives.11 Moreover, the consequences of carrying a fetus to
term or aborting it are largely absent from the debate. 12 Both the pro-
choice and anti-abortion scholarship reflect an ignorance of the larger
socioeconomic circumstances surrounding pregnancy. For example, in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 13 a case involving the constitutionality of a two-
parent notification requirement for adolescents, both the majority and
dissenting Justices ignored the socioeconomic conditions under which
adolescents find themselves pregnant, including, for example, coercive
sexual experiences and inaccessible contraceptives. The primary focus of
all of the opinions is how a parental notification requirement affects the
existing family unit-parents and pregnant teenager-and largely fails to
consider how such a requirement affects the pregnant teenager's life, as
well as the lives of her future offspring and family unit. 14
Thus, some commentators (and Justices) seem to believe that we can
resolve the abortion debate by making moral arguments that are largely
inattentive to the empirical literature that concerns the lives of women
and their children. 15 Of course, abortion is a moral issue. But more im-
11. "Because contraceptives and their uses are not perfect, the 38 million sexually active wo-
men and their partners using contraceptives account for 1.5 million unintended pregnancies, 43% of
all unintended pregnancies in the United States." RACHEL BENSON GOLD, ABORTION AND NVO-
MEN'S HEALTH: A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICA? 12 (1990).
12. For an especially insensitive account of the impact of reproductive decisions on women's
lives, see Robert Araujo, Fetal Jurisprudence-A Debate in the Abstract, 33 CATHOLIC LAW. 203
(1990). When I saw the title of this article, I thought it was a spoof because I couldn't imagine
anyone deliberately creating an entirely abstract argument which considers fetuses but not pregnant
women. However, as far as I can tell, the author is quite serious in trying to hide himself behind a
veil of ignorance.
13. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
14. See id, at 2941-44 (identifying issues considered by the court in the case).
15. See, eg., ABORTION & CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE (Patricia Beattie Jung &
Thomas Shannon eds. 1988) (containing both pro-choice and anti-abortion articles, none of which
refers to the empirical, reproductive health literature); Robert Araujo, supra note 12 (attempting to
resolve the abortion issue by considering the rights of fetuses entirely in the abstract, without consid-
ering the empirical literature about women's well-being).
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portantly, abortion is an issue about the quality of the lives of women and
their children. If we want to demonstrate our moral concern about life-
the basis of the moral arguments made by both pro-choice and anti-abor-
tion advocates-then we need to be attentive to the empirical literature
about those lives.
16
A reproductive health perspective,17 by contrast, considers the full
consequences of a woman's reproductive capacity and sexual behavior.
In other words, a reproductive health perspective would discuss the na-
ture of sexual activity (e.g., whether it is consensual), the use and availa-
bility of contraceptives, the availability of pre- and post-natal care, the
socioeconomic and physical consequences of motherhood, the socioeco-
nomic status and physical health of the child that is born, the availability
of adoption, as well as the availability and consequences of abortion.
Although the feminist slogan of "pro-choice" attempts to emphasize the
importance of the choice to bear children as well as the choice not to bear
children, the public debate often focuses only on the choice of abortion.
In addition, a reproductive health perspective can provide substan-
tial insight into the real nature of the problem of adolescent pregnancy.
The emerging discussion of the "problem of teenage pregnancy" assumes
that the underlying problems are the pregnancy and the young age at
which it occurs.' 8 However, the pregnancy becomes problematic because
of the inadequate social resources devoted to facilitating the pregnancy.
In addition, youth is not necessarily the problem for all subgroups of
women. For example, the negative socioeconomic consequences of child-
birth are problematic for Hispanic women, on average, irrespective of the
age that they give birth.19 The underlying problem may be class-based,
rather than determined by age or race, meaning that we need to spend
dollars to alleviate the conditions of poverty rather than blame adoles-
cents for engaging in sexual activity, or African-American or Hispanic
women for having too many children. The anti-essentialism critique re-
minds us not to assume that the essential factors that determine problem-
16. Justice Marshall referred to this empirical literature with approval in Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at
2952-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). However, I believe that even Justice
Marshall's discussion was insufficient because he ignored the socioeconomic conditions that cause
adolescents to face unintended pregnancies.
17. The group most responsible for articulating a reproductive health perspective is the Alan
Guttmacher Institute with its publication Family Planning Perspective. Although family planning
issues are only a subset of reproductive health issues, Family Planning Perspectives publishes exten-
sive material on all reproductive health issues. Fortunately, the ideas and information this organiza-
tion provides received attention by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in Hodgson. See id.
at 2951-60.
18. That assumption is pervasive in Petchesky's discussion of adolescent reproductive issues.
See ROSALIND PETCHESKY, supra note 9.
19. See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 32-33.
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atic pregnancies and childcare responsibilities are age or race; it suggests
that we examine other variables to understand fully why certain sub-
groups of women face more serious negative consequences from
pregnancies.
Finally, a reproductive health perspective can provide a useful dis-
tinction between the supposed problems of adolescent pregnancy and ad-
olescent sexual activity. Some commentators assume that the "teenage
pregnancy" problem is related to the "problem of teenage sexual activ-
ity."20 But sexual activity, in itself, is not necessarily a problem. The
problem is the lack of access to and use of effective contraceptives during
sexual activity that creates unintended pregnancy and early childbirth,
and inadequate prenatal care that makes the pregnancies harmful to the
pregnant woman and fetus. Only as a consequence of our failure in these
other areas of reproductive health does abortion become a problem.
Somehow, the public debate always seems to focus on the wrong
variables.
Nonetheless, I do not want to suggest that the reproductive health
literature is unproblematic. This literature is accustomed to placing peo-
ple into categories-Hispanic, African-American, poor, female, etc.
These categories themselves are riddled with assumptions. How do we
define who is "African-American?" How poor is "poor?" In addition,
this literature selects only certain categories to examine. For example, I
was able to find substantial amounts of literature on African-American
women, some literature on Hispanic women, and virtually no literature
on other racial subgroups. Very little literature discusses the special
problems faced by adolescent women who are handicapped, lesbian, 21 or
victims of incest. The importance of being able to define which catego-
20. This assumption is pervasive in the anti-abortion movement, which is also anti-sex (outside
the context of marriage and procreation). James Trussell, a reproductive health practitioner, does an
excellent job distinguishing between the issues of sexual activity and pregnancy. See James Trussell,
Teenage Pregnancy in the Unite4 States, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 262 (1988) (low contraceptive use is
a contributing factor to teenage pregnancy rates).
21. One reader of a draft of this Essay inquired as to why I listed lesbians, since they would not
appear to need information on either birth control or abortion. In fact, many lesbians do choose to
utilize artificial insemination in order to bear children, and therefore need both family planning
information as well as assistance from the health care community. In addition, a lesbian, like any
other woman who gets pregnant, may find that she needs to consider the option of abortion during
the course of her pregnancy. An initially intended pregnancy can become an unwanted pregnancy
due to various social, economic, and physical conditions. The societal disapproval of lesbians getting
pregnant often makes it difficult for them to receive the reproductive health services that they desire.
See generally Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A
Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
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ries are important then gets emphasized in later research, such as mine,
which builds on those primary sources. 22
In the analysis that follows, I try to document quantitatively and
qualitatively the various ways that pregnancies disadvantage the lives of
adolescents and their children. This data should support Justice Stevens'
concurrence (joined by Justice Brennan) in Hodgson in which he con-
cluded that, on the facts presented, it was constitutionally impermissible
for a state to promote childbirth over abortion for adolescents. 23 In addi-
tion, I show how U.S. reproductive health policy, ranging from sex edu-
cation to abortion to adoption, systematically compounds rather than
relieves these problems. This entire picture, I believe, should be used to
persuade courts to examine U.S. family planning policy with the utmost
scrutiny in terms of its impact on female adolescents.
II. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED
PREGNANCIES AND EARLY CHILDBIRTH
A. Introduction
"One out of every ten women 15-19 years old becomes pregnant
each year in the United States, a proportion that has changed little in the
last fifteen years."' 24 It was estimated in 1981 that more than five million
women fifteen to nineteen years old were at risk of unintended preg-
nancy.25 Although forty-three percent of unintended pregnancies occur
among women using contraceptives, 26 three-fourths of all unintended ad-
olescent pregnancies occur to those who do not practice contraception. 27
22. Feminists have done an excellent job criticizing many of the subjective and unexamined
biases of so-called objective science. See, ag., BIOLOGICAL WOMAN-THE CONVENIENT MYTH: A
COLLECTION OF FEMINIST ESSAYS AND A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (Ruth Hubbard, Mary
Sue Henefin & Barbara Fried eds. 1982). I do not believe, however, that their critique requires us to
abandon the use of empirical literature entirely, especially when that literature tries to reflect wo-
men's needs and concerns. Thus, I have chosen to use empirical literature in this Essay, which I
believe is respectful of women's well-being while acknowledging that this literature is far from per-
fect. My choice to utilize empirical literature is not intended to denigrate the importance and useful-
ness of other kinds of information concerning women. Ideally, we should combine this empirical
evidence with other kinds of information collected by feminists, such as experiential literature. In
previous works, I have tried to examine some of that other literature. See Ruth Colker, Feminism,
Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1064-67
(1989). In this Essay, however, I am largely limiting myself to the empirical literature. The task of
interweaving empirical and experiential literature must be left until later.
23. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2937 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. James Trussell, supra note 20, at 262.
25. Margaret Terry Orr, Private Physicians and the Provision of Contraceptives to Adolescents
16 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 83 (1984).
26. See supra note 11.
27. James Trussell, supra note 20, at 262.
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The U.S. teenage birthrate is much higher than that of other devel-
oped countries, with the maximum relative difference occurring for ado-
lescents under the age of fifteen. Moreover, this disparity continues to
grow.28 Since 1973, although the proportion of wanted births has risen
for women age twenty-five to thirty-nine, the proportion of births that
were considered "mistimed" for never-married adolescents increased by
thirty-seven percent.29 Unwanted 3o childbearing is more common
among unmarried African-Americans than among their white counter-
parts (thirty percent versus eighteen percent), but varies little among un-
married African-American women according to the mother's current
age. By contrast, the rate of unwanted childbearing among single white
women is almost cut in half after the age of twenty-four. White and
African-American women appear to be similarly situated after age thirty-
three with respect to unwanted childbirth, but quite dissimilarly situated
under age twenty-four.
31
Statistics for Hispanics are often not reported separately. However,
one study indicated that in 1985, about 39,000 Hispanics age fifteen to
nineteen obtained abortions, for an abortion rate of fifty per 1000 births.
"The abortion rate was about thirty-two percent higher than the abortion
rate for whites of the same age, but almost thirty percent lower than that
of nonwhites.' ' 32 Hispanics age fifteen to nineteen had approximately
65,000 births in 1985 for a birthrate of eighty-five per 1000, which was
close to the non-white rate of ninety. 33 In other words, Hispanic women,
age fifteen to nineteen, are about as likely as non-white women to give
birth but less likely to have an abortion.
28. Elise Jones, Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Noreen Goldman, Stanley Henshaw, Richard Lin.
coln, Jeannie Rosoff, Charles Westoff & Deirdre Wulf, Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries"
Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 53, 55 (1985).
29. Unwanted Childbearing in United States Declines, But Levels Still High Among Blacks, Sin-
gles, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 274 (1985) (digest section reporting on recent study) [hereinafter Un-
wanted Childbearing].
30. I refer to "unwanted" childbearing in order to be respectful to the reproductive desires of
women. A high birthrate is only problematic when the women who are pregnant do not desire the
births.
31. Unwanted Childbearing, supra note 29 (citing W.C. Pratt and M.C. Horn, Wanted and
Unwanted Childbearing United States, 1973-1982, Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics,
No. 108 (1985)).
The 1985 statistics confirm the relatively high fertility rate for teenagers. Per 1000 women, the
pregnancy rate for females was 16.6 for females under age 15 and 109.8 for females age 15 to 19.
(For older women, the comparable statistics are around 10%.) For non-white females, these figures
are much higher: 50.8 for females under age 15 and 185.8 for females age 15 to 19. Stanley Hen-
shaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Teenage Abortion, Birth and Pregnancy Statistics An Update, 21 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 85 (1989).




In 1979, forty-seven percent of white metropolitan women age ff-
teen to nineteen were sexually active, as were sixty-six percent of their
African-American counterparts. 34 Although African-American adoles-
cents are more likely to be sexually active than white adolescents, they
also are less likely to use contraceptives. Forty percent of African-Amer-
ican adolescents, as contrasted with twenty-four percent of whites, re-
ported never having used a contraceptive during intercourse.3 5 These
statistics yield the not-surprising result that, in 1979, thirty percent of
African-American teenage women in metropolitan areas had had a pre-
marital pregnancy, as compared to fourteen percent of whites.
In understanding these statistics, however, it is important to control
for social class. Within the group of African-American teenage women,
for example, dramatic differences in contraceptive use exist depending
upon social class. One study found that forty-four percent of African-
American teenage women who were of high social class, had intact fami-
lies, and resided in a non-ghetto neighborhood, used a contraceptive at
first intercourse, as compared with only twelve percent of those who were
of low social class, did not have intact families, and resided in a ghetto
neighborhood.36 The statistics for these "higher class" African-Ameri-
can women appear to be similar to a comparable group of white women,
thus demonstrating the importance of social class and race in under-
standing the problem of adolescent pregnancy. This finding about con-
traceptive use at first intercourse is important because other studies
demonstrate that those who use contraceptives at first intercourse are
more consistent users thereafter.37
Thus, the problem of unintended pregnancies is dramatic for all
groups of adolescents. Thirty percent of unmarried, African-American
adolescents who live in metropolitan areas face an unintended preg-
nancy, as do fourteen percent of similarly situated white adolescents.
Each year, more than five million sexually-active female adolescents face
a possible unintended pregnancy, which is compounded by the fact that
three-fourths of them do not practice contraception. One million of
them become pregnant each year, with 470,000 giving birth to a child.
38
These statistics demonstrate that the phenomenon of large numbers of
unwanted births is primarily class based. Poor, adolescent women do not
34. Dennis Hogan, Nan Marie Astone & Evelyn Kitagawa, Social and Environmental Factors
Influencing Contraceptive Use Among Black Adolescents, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 165 (1985).
35. Id.
36. Id at 168.
37. Id at 168-69.
38. Comment, Risking the Future: A Symposium on the National Academy of Sciences Report
on Teenage Pregnancy, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119 (1987).
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have the opportunity to choose the conditions under which they become
pregnant to the same extent as middle-class women.
Because the problem of unwanted pregnancies is a class-based prob-
lem, which disproportionately affects female adolescents, the expenditure
of public funds targeted at adolescents could make a real difference in the
lives of women. Nevertheless, as I discuss, we have an entirely ineffective
public program for limiting unwanted adolescent pregnancies. In fact,
our public policy encourages childbirth over contraception or abortion;
we facilitate the problem rather than solve it.
B. Consequences of Early Childbirth for the Mother
To understand the magnitude of the problem of unintended
pregnancies for adolescents, we need to understand the impact on the
physical health of the mother, as well as the socioeconomic consequences
stemming from early childbirth. Female adolescents face substantial
negative consequences from early childbirth, although the source of these
problems may often be socioeconomic rather than age-related. Early
childbirth, in itself, need not cause negative physical and socioeconomic
consequences. It does, however, because adolescent mothers are dispro-
portionately poor. In addition, they often are without effective assistance
from state-funded or other health care providers during their pregnancies
and after their children are born.
1. Physical Health. "[A]dolescent mothers between the ages of
fifteen and nineteen years are twice as likely to die from hemorrhage and
miscarriage than mothers over twenty years of age."' 39 The maternal
mortality and morbidity rate is sixty percent higher for this group than
for older women.40 Adolescent mothers are "23 percent more likely to
experience a premature birth with complications such as anemia, pro-
longed labor and nutritional deficiency," and ninety-two percent more
likely to experience anemia than older mothers.4 1 The risk of health
39. Alva Barnett, Factors that Adversely Affect the Health and Well-Being of African-American
Adolescent Mothers and Their Infants, in TEENAGE PREGNANCY: DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR
CHANGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 101, 105 (Dionne Jones & Stanley Battle eds. 1990)
(citing Klerman, Adolescent Pregnancy: A New Look at a Continuing Problem, 70 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 776, 776-78 (1980)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 106. Another study found that anemia occurs more frequently among teenagers than
among older women. Carolyn Makinson, The Health Consequences of Teenage Fertility, 17 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 132, 133 (1985). Four other studies found a significant difference in toxemia in ado-
lescence. Id A Canadian study of teenage pregnancy and health complications found that teenagers
had a higher incidence of eclampsia and anemia than older women. Id
One study reported that in France and the United States teenagers had a higher mortality rate
than older women, whereas in England and Wales they did not. Id. at 134. The actual statistics
[V/ol. 1991:324
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH POLICY
problems and medical complications are even higher for African-Ameri-
can adolescents because of the inequitable distribution of resources in
society.42
Socioeconomic factors, rather than age, seem to contribute substan-
tially to adverse health consequences from teenage pregnancy.43 Recent
research in the United States has shown that many of the adverse health
consequences of adolescent childbearing documented by earlier studies
were overstated because of a lack of adequate controls for socioeconomic
status.44 Several studies suggest that pregnancy outcomes among adoles-
cents who receive good prenatal care are no different from, or are better
than, those of older women.45 Thus, the underlying problem is one of
poverty. As we will see, our Medicaid policies do little to assist women
and their children during pregnancy.
In countries where adverse health consequences were not found for
adolescents, an excellent prenatal care system was in place.46 Thus, it is
not the age or race of the adolescents that cause their pregnancy to coin-
cide with adverse health consequences, but it is the lack of access to ade-
quate prenatal care that causes these adverse health consequences. In
fact, some authors seem to believe that adolescents would have healthier
pregnancies than older women if they received adequate prenatal care.47
2. Education. Education is a very important variable because it
strongly correlates with socioeconomic status.48 Because no literature
that I have been able to find actually traces the relative earning power of
suggest, however, that this statement is inaccurate. The maternal mortality rate for black women,
under the age of 15, is 43.7 per 100,000 live births and, for white women, is 23 per 100,000 live
births. These rates are higher than the rate for African-American women until age 25 and for white
women until age 35. However, the maternal mortality rate for teenagers, age 15-19, is lower for
African-American and white women than for older women. Thus, maternal mortality appears to
increase with age, except for teenagers under the age of 15, who have a disproportionately high
mortality rate. The marked difference in maternal mortality is actually based more on race than age.
The maternal mortality rate for African-American women, of any age group, is at least twice and
sometimes four times as high, as the rate for white women. African-American women, age 40-44,
for example, face a maternal mortality rate of 236.8 deaths per 100,000 live births. In other words,
more than .02% of African-American women, age 40-44, die during their pregnancy. Id
42. Alva Barnett, supra note 39, at 106.
43. Carolyn Makinson, supra note 41, at 132. For example, one U.S. study found that African-
American teenagers in urban clinics had a high rate of pregnancy-induced hypertension, anemia,
prematurity and perinatal mortality, but that teenagers from more economically advantaged back-
grounds did not have more health complications than older women. Id at 133.
44. James Trussell, supra note 20, at 268.
45. Id.
46. Makinson, supra note 41, at 133 (reporting Swedish experience).
47. See supra notes 41 & 43.
48. Conversation with sociology professor Rosemary Gartner, University of Toronto, Depart-
ment of Sociology (Summer 1990).
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pregnant and nonpregnant adolescents, the literature on educational at-
tainment comes closest to predicting the earning power of pregnant ado-
lescents versus nonpregnant adolescents.
High school graduation rates are affected markedly for women age
twenty-one to twenty-nine, by age at first birth. As of 1986, African-
American women who delay their first birth until age twenty have a bet-
ter than ninety-two percent chance of graduating from high school.49 By
contrast, African-American women who have their first child under the
age of seventeen have only a sixty percent chance of high school gradua-
tion, and African-American women who have their first birth at the age
of eighteen to nineteen have only a seventy-five percent chance of high
school graduation.50 For white women the statistics are comparable, ex-
cept that white women who have their first child under the age of seven-
teen have only a fifty-four percent chance of high school graduation.5 1
Thus, both African-American and white women who bear children while
under the age of twenty have a significantly greater chance of not gradu-
ating from high school than women who delay childbirth until after age
twenty.
Another study found that in 1983, ninety-five percent of white wo-
men, ninety-three percent of African-American women, and eighty-seven
percent of Hispanic women who had not borne children had received a
high school diploma or GED certificate.52 For African-American and
white women, roughly sixty percent of them completed high school if
they had a child within seven months after leaving school.53 Hispanic
women, however, had only a thirty-three percent chance of completing
school if they conceived a child while in high school but gave birth after
leaving school, and had a fifty-nine percent chance of completing high
school if they both conceived and gave birth before leaving school.54 The
latter statistic is about ten percentage points lower than the comparable
group of African-American and white women; however, the former sta-
tistic is more than twenty percentage points lower than the comparable
group of African-American and white women. Thus, early childbearing
has a dramatic influence in the educational lives of Hispanic women, and
a very significant influence in the educational lives of white and African-
American women.
49. Dawn Upchurch & James McCarthy, Adolescent Childbearing and High School Completion
in the 1980s: Have Things Changed?, 21 FAm. PLAN. PERsP. 199, 200 (1989).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 199.
52. Frank Mott & William Marsiglio, Early Childbearing and Completion of High School, 17
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Although the impact of early childbearing may be more significant
for Hispanic women than for African-American or white women, it is
interesting to note that Hispanic women are much less likely to bear chil-
dren before leaving school than are African-American women. Nineteen
percent of African-American women gave birth before leaving school in
1983, whereas only seven percent of Hispanic women gave birth before
leaving school.55 (The figure for white women was four percent.) Thus,
if we encourage African-American and Hispanic women to use contra-
ception during high school if they are sexually active, their pregnancies
more likely will be intentional rather than unwanted or mistimed. The
reasons for targeting them are somewhat different. African-American
women are at a greater risk of giving birth before leaving school than
Hispanic women, but Hispanic women are more likely to face serious
consequences when they do give birth before leaving school.
More adolescent mothers are now graduating from high school than
ever before.56 However, graduation rates did not increase equally among
all racial and socioeconomic groups, and the increases did not occur in
the same periods for all groups.5 7 Ironically, African-American adoles-
cents made the greatest progress in graduating from high school, despite
their pregnancy, before federal law made it illegal for schools receiving
federal funds to expel students because of pregnancy or childbirth.5 8 The
statistics also make clear that race, rather than socioeconomic status, are
important predictors of high school graduation among pregnant adoles-
cents. For example, the increase in the graduation rate from 1975 to
1986 among white mothers from disadvantaged backgrounds was over
200% as compared with eighty-seven percent for similar African-Ameri-
can mothers.5 9
55. Id at 237.
56. Dawn Upchurch & James McCarthy, supra note 49, at 199.
57. Id
58. Id (reporting that African-American teenagers made the greatest progress between 1958
and 1975, whereas Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235,
373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1685 (1988)), did not become effective until 1975).
The author of this study is not exactly accurate in her description of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. That law prohibited sex-based discrimination in educational programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. The regulations accompanying the statute interpreted
the law to forbid pregnancy-based discrimination. The Supreme Court's subsequent conclusion in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that sex-based discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 778 Stat. 241,253-66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)), does not include pregnancy-based discrimination, would also seem to apply
to Title IX. Thus, the regulations to Title IX may have applied to pregnancy-based distinctions. It
is questionable, however, whether those regulations are valid.
59. Dawn Upchurch & James McCarthy, supra note 49, at 202 (also reporting that one needs
to view statistics about improvements in gaining high school diplomas with caution because other
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
This evidence suggests that we need to modify our strategy for ado-
lescents to encourage them to stay in school during and after their
pregnancies. Federal law that prohibits pregnancy-related discrimina-
tion in education does not appear to help African-American adolescents.
But it also seems clear that it is inappropriate to focus on early childbirth
as the crucial factor in explaining the socioeconomic future of African-
American and Hispanic adolescents. Their upward economic mobility
appears to be limited irrespective of whether they bear children while
they are adolescents; our social policies need to assist their lives more
holistically rather than to focus exclusively on early childbearing.
C. Consequences of Early Childbirth to the Child
Children born to adolescents do not fare well. Despite the media's
focus on the race and age of mothers affecting the children's health, so-
cioeconomic factors, rather than the age of the mother, seem to be the
most important determinant of both prematurity and low birth weight. °
Inadequate prenatal care has been singled out as an important determi-
nant.61 The mother's age affects the long-term future consequences for
the child more than her age affects the child's immediate situation.
Although studies show association of socioeconomic status with neona-
tal, postnatal, and sudden infant death, they also show an association of
age with the cognitive, social, and economic development of the child.
62
The gap between the rates for African-American and white low
birth weight (LBW) and very low birth weight (VLBW) infants has been
increasing in recent years. The risk for African-American infants, as
compared with white infants, of being LBW increased from 2.1 in 1975
to 2.2 in 1985, where it has remained.63 The relative risk of VLBW in-
fants also increased (from 2.6 in 1975 to 2.9 in 1987) for African-Ameri-
can infants as compared with white infants.64 Within each high risk
subgroup (unmarried, under twenty years of age, less than twelve years
of education, inadequate prenatal care) African-American mothers are
twice as likely to have LBW infants and two to three times as likely to
have VLBW infants.65 These statistics are disappointing because LBW is
considered to be an important indicator of infant morbidity and mortal-
studies indicate that adolescents who become mothers are less likely to continue their education in
college, which is not discussed in studies of high school completion).
60. Carolyn Makinson, supra note 41, at 135-36.
61. Id at 135.
62. Id at 137-38.






ity. In quantitative terms, one author concluded that almost 20,000 Afri-
can-American infants who died during the first year of life over the last
five years would have lived had their access to health care been equal to
that of white infants.66
It is important, however, not to focus entirely on low birth rate as a
problem contributing to infant mortality. Recent studies have found that
normal and optimal birth-weight babies, born to African-American
mothers, have a poorer survival rate than normal and optimal birth-
weight babies born to white mothers.67 Thus, even if we succeed in creat-
ing social policies that will raise the birth weight of African-American
babies, we also need to create social policies that will assist these babies,
after birth, when they have achieved normal or optimal birth weights.
Interestingly, the variables of early pregnancy and low birth weight are
more significant in the lives of white females than African-American fe-
males. In other words, as a child or as an adult, the hardships of being
African-American are significant even when obvious problems such as
low birth weight or early pregnancy have been avoided. An emphasis on
the problem of low birth weight may be more reflective of the experience
of white women and their children than of African-American women
and their children.
Some studies have shown that inadequate or no prenatal care is an
important factor in predicting infant mortality. For both African-Amer-
ican and white infants, the risk of mortality is approximately double if
prenatal care is absent or if care is not obtained until the third trimes-
ter.68 Among Hispanic infants, however, the odds of infant mortality
remain quite low, regardless of when prenatal care is obtained.69 This
result is puzzling since Hispanics tend to be of low socioeconomic status;
the anomaly deserves further attention.
Children born to adolescents are more likely to be involved in acci-
dents during the first five years of life, and more likely to be admitted to a
hospital because of accidents and gastrointestinal infections, than are
childreu born to older women.70 This relationship exists after adjust-
ment for the effects of socioeconomic and biological factors.
66. Alva Barnett, supra note 39, at 106-07.
67. Way to Lower Black Neonatal Mortality Not Simple, Study Finds, 17 FAm. PLAN. PERSP.
129 (1985) (reporting N.J. Binkin, R.L. Williams, CJ.RL Hogue & P.M. Chen, Reducing Black
Neonatal Mortality: Will Improvement in Birth Weight be Enough?, 253 J. A.M.A. 372 (1985)).
68. Jeanette Johnson, U.S Differentials in Infant Mortality: Why Do They Persist?, 19 FAm.
PLAN. PERSP. 227, 231-32 (1987).
69. Id. at 232.




One needs to be careful not to overgeneralize concerning the rela-
tionship between maternal age and the well-being of children. One
study, conducted entirely on African-American and Hispanic women
who had given birth to their first children on the wards of a New York
City hospital in 1975, found that there was no relationship between ma-
ternal age and the well-being of children.71 This study suggests that pre-
vious studies may not have appropriately controlled for socioeconomic
and racial status. If one controlled for socioeconomic and racial status,
age would not be a significant factor in predicting the health of infants-
at least for poor Hispanic and African-American women.
72
In sum, poverty again seems to be the key factor in explaining the
health and well-being of children. By failing to provide effective welfare
programs to assure these children basic food, education, and housing, we
are helping to perpetuate a gruesome cycle of poverty. Early childbirth
is only a problem because of its correlation with poverty; we need to
attack the poverty rather than simply the early childbirth.
D. Contraception and Sex Education
One way to avoid the problems of early childbirth is to use contra-
ception to avoid pregnancy. Nevertheless, as compared with other west-
ern countries, U.S. social policy is entirely ineffectual in preventing early
childbirth for poor adolescents through contraception. In 1978, the
United States Congress passed the Adolescent Health, Services, and
Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act,73 which promoted the distribution
of contraceptives and abortion counseling or referral. In 1981, Congress
folded the Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and
Care Act into the Maternal and Child Health block grant to the states,
and enacted the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA).74 The AFLA is
fundamentally different from the 1978 Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention
Act in that it supports "chastity" and adoption, but not contraception or
abortion. Although the 1978 Act required grantees to offer counseling
and referral about abortion, the 1981 Act forbids such counseling or
referral. 75
71. Katherine Darabi, Elizabeth Graham, Pearila Namerow, Susan Philliber & Phyllis Varga,
The Effect of Maternal Age on the Well-being of Children, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 933 (1984).
72. Id. at 934.
73. Health Services and Centers Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626, §§ 601-08, 92 Stat.
3551, 3595-601 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-21 to -28; repealed by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 955, 95 Stat. 357, 578-92 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988)).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988).
75. See Patricia Donovan, The Adolescent Family Life Act And the Promotion of Religious Doc-
trine, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 222-23 (1984).
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The rationale behind this approach is the assumption that sex edu-
cation and the availability of contraceptives and abortions promotes sex-
ual behavior and unintended pregnancies. 76 Proponents consider the
message of abstinence to be the most effective way to limit teenage sexual
activity and thus unintended pregnancies. However, empirical surveys
suggest the opposite. Studies of teenage pregnancy in developed coun-
tries show that countries with more liberal attitudes toward talking about
sex have the lowest birthrates. 77 In addition, one study found that expo-
sure to contraceptive education had no consistent effect on the
probability that a woman, who had not previously experienced inter-
course, would subsequently initiate intercourse. 78 A study of predomi-
nantly poor, inner-city African-American adolescents in Baltimore found
that a program that combined sex education, counseling, and contracep-
tive services, with an emphasis on the development of personal responsi-
bility, goal setting, and communication with parents, reduced pregnancy
rates substantially and contributed to delaying the onset of sexual activ-
ity.79 Thus, increased sex education may actually delay the onset of sex-
ual activity as well as reduce the pregnancy rate.80
The U.S. policy on family planning, as compared to other developed
countries, differs in one important respect. In the United States, policy
analysts are not sure whether they should advocate the prevention of
teenage sexual activity or unwanted teenage pregnancy; in other devel-
oped countries, national policy is squarely behind preventing unwanted
teenage pregnancy irrespective of the prevalence of sexual activity among
adolescents.81 Thus, easily accessible and relatively free contraceptives,
76. In the only legal argument that I have been able to find that defends this program, the
author does not explain the rationale behind this policy choice. He simply repeatedly asserts that the
government is entitled to choose childbirth over abortion, without explaining why that choice would
be prudent for teenagers. Theodore Hirt, Commentary: Why the Government is Not Required to
Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral 101 HARv. L. REv. 1895, 1896 (1988) (author was the
Assistant Branch Director in the Federal Programs branch of the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice).
77. Elise Jones et al., supra note 28, at 54.
78. James Trussell, supra note 20, at 267.
79. Id. However, Trussell cautions the reader that the delay in intercourse was mitigated by
other factors, so that one needs to read that result with caution.
80. One assumption that often seems to accompany discussions of the usefulness of sex educa-
tion programs is that it is necessarily bad if such programs serve to encourage sexual activity among
adolescents. James Trussell observes that the prevalence of sexual activity should not be so relevant
to the discussion about these programs. Instead, he argues that preventing pregnancy should be
judged the most important factor, irrespective of the rates of teenage sexual activity. Id. at 269. As
long as sexual activity is consensual, our primary focus should be on the prevention of unintended
pregnancies. In fact, I would even go further and say that our focus should be on preventing unin-
tended childbirth and childcare rather than pregnancy, unless studies demonstrate that abortion or
adoption have negative consequences for pregnant adolescents.
81. Elise Jones et al., supra note 28, at 60-61.
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which are made available in most developed countries and which sub-
stantially help to lower the rate of unintended teenage pregnancy, are not
part of the U.S. national family planning policy. Due to a lack of sex
education or public discussion about contraception, adolescents are more
likely to hear about abortion than about how to prevent pregnancy
through contraception.82 As one group of commentators has observed,
U.S. adolescents "seem to have inherited the worst of all possible worlds
regarding their exposure to messages about sex."8
3
Another important aspect of an effective contraceptive policy would
be to have a wide range of inexpensive contraceptive services available to
adolescents. American adolescents, however, do not have many services
readily available to them. Most adolescents obtain contraceptives (if
they obtain them at all) at family planning clinics rather than from pri-
vate physicians.8 Only seven out of ten clinics, and five out of ten pri-
vate physicians, accept Medicaid payment for contraceptive services.
Thus, poor adolescents may have no affordable way to obtain the contra-
ceptive pill, which is generally considered to be the most appropriate
birth control option for adolescent females. In addition, many private
physicians will not serve an unmarried minor without parental consent.85
We know the difficulties of parental consent and notification statutes
from the abortion cases. If a pregnant teenager feels uncomfortable tell-
ing her parents that she is pregnant in order to be able to obtain an abor-
tion, then she would likely also feel uncomfortable in telling her parents
that she is sexually active in order to get their Medicaid card to see a
doctor for the contraceptive pill.
Even when sex education does exist, it is often not adequate or effec-
tive. For example, one study found that of those adolescents who did
have sex education, thirty-four percent could not correctly identify the
time during the menstrual cycle when conception is most likely to oc-
cur.8 6 In addition, ninety percent of the sex education that schools pro-
vide about contraceptives and where to get them occurs after ninth
grade, despite evidence that adolescents initiate sexual activity in their
82. Id
83. Id at 61.
84. Margaret Orr, Private Physicians and the Provision of Contraceptives to Adolescents, 16
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 83, 86 (1984); see also William Mosher, Use of Family Planning Services in the
United States: 1982 and 1988, 184 ADVANCE DATA 1 (April 11, 1990) (reporting that black women,
poor women, and teenagers were more likely to rely on clinics for their reproductive health services
than were white, higher-income, and older women).
85. Margaret Orr, supra note 84, at 86.
86. James Trussell, supra note 20, at 267.
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early teens.8 7 Thus, it is not sufficient for sex education to exist; it must
be comprehensive both in its coverage and in its audience.
The only good news in the family planning area is that the United
States Congress has modified Medicaid so that women who do not meet
the income and family structure criteria for cash assistance are eligible
for Medicaid as long as they meet certain income criteria. By July 1990,
states had to extend Medicaid coverage to infants and pregnant women
with incomes up to the federal poverty level, and had the option of cover-
ing infants and pregnant women with incomes up to 185% of the poverty
level. As of July 1988, forty states have opted to expand their Medicaid
programs to cover infants and pregnant women with incomes of 100% of
the poverty level.88 It is too soon to assess whether that money is actu-
ally reaching poor, pregnant adolescents.
Finally, it is important to recognize that effective sex education pro-
grams will not prevent unintended pregnancies as long as only current
contraceptive technology is available. For example, fifty-one percent of
all abortion patients in a 1987 study reported that they were practicing
contraception during the month in which they conceived. 9 Of those
who had stopped practicing contraception, about fifteen percent had
ceased using the pill within one month of becoming pregnant, forty-four
percent had ceased using the pill within three months of becoming preg-
nant.90 These former pill users were probably not using contraceptives
because they mistakenly believed that after a woman stops using the pill
that she has a several month "grace" period during which she will not
become pregnant. 91 Only nine percent of women obtaining abortions had
had no prior contraceptive experience. 92 Thus, it is simply not true that
women who have abortions are ignorant of the importance of practicing
contraception or unwilling to make an effort to avoid pregnancy. The
evidence strongly suggests that women experience problems in success-
fully using even the most effective methods of contraception. 93 Rather
than place all the blame on women, it is important to recognize that
87. Id.
88. Rachel Benson Gold & Sandra Guardado, Public Funding of Family Planning, Sterilization
and Abortion Services, 1987, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228, 228 (1988).
89. Stanley Henshaw & Jane Silverman, The Characteristics and Prior Contraceptive Use of US.
Abortion Patients, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158, 165 (1988).
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id at 167.
93. Id at 168.
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contraceptive technology itself has inherent limitations which result in
many unintended pregnancies. 94
In sum, U.S. contraception and sex education policy is entirely inef-
fective in preventing unintended teenage pregnancy. Our policies send a
confused and ineffectual message to adolescents and cause the United
States to have the least effective contraception and sex education pro-
gram in the western world. In addition, we have failed to devote ade-
quate resources to developing safe, cheap, and effective contraceptives.
Legislative policy is inept; the poor, pregnant adolescents disproportion-
ately pay the heavy price for this incompetence.
E. Prenatal Care
Another way to avoid some of the negative consequences of early
childbirth, especially for the child, is to have available an excellent sys-
tem of prenatal care. The importance of adequate prenatal care cannot
be overstated. Six in ten women, in general, are treated for some preg-
nancy-related medical problems. 95 Three in ten women are reported to
have had major complications from pregnancy.96 Women who do not
obtain adequate prenatal care are much more likely than those who do to
have a low birth-weight baby, to gain too little weight during pregnancy,
or to have a premature birth.97 Because nearly half of all women under
the age of twenty receive inadequate prenatal care,98 these women are at
high risk of having pregnancy-related complications. By not preventing
these complications early in the pregnancy, we raise the ultimate cost of
the medical complications associated with the pregnancy and place the
mother's and child's health at risk.
Despite the importance of effective and accessible prenatal care, it is
no more available to poor adolescents after pregnancy than were contra-
ceptives and sex education prior to pregnancy. Although much contro-
versy exists concerning appropriate contraceptive policy, no controversy
exists concerning the importance of adequate prenatal care for pregnant
women. In 1980, the United States Surgeon General called for an in-
94. I have not even discussed the lack of contraceptive research in the United States, as com-
pared with Europe. Although only a minority of people who oppose abortion also oppose contracep-
tion, that small fringe of the pro-life movement has managed to curtail contraception research in the
United States. Although RU 486 is not, in most cases, a contraceptive, the total stalemate in the
United States concerning this drug reflects the lack of progress being made in the United States with
regard to contraceptives.
95. Rachel Benson Gold, Asta Kenney & Susheela Singh, Paying for Maternity Care in the
United States. 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 190, 192 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Id at 193.
98. Id at 192.
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crease, by 1990, of at least ninety percent in the proportion of women in
each racial and ethnic group who receive care in the first trimester of
pregnancy.99 The United States has made progress in reaching this goal
for married, white, adult, non-poor women, but has made no progress in
reaching this goal for adolescents of all racial subgroups. In fact, the
proportion of non-white women who received first-trimester care be-
tween 1980 and 1982 actually declined 00 Some commentators attribute
this decline to tightened eligibility for Medicaid coverage and cutbacks in
funding of maternal health services for the poor. 101 The unavailability of
publicly-funded prenatal care becomes especially troubling when one re-
alizes that 32.1% of the babies born are born into families with a yearly
income of 150% or less of the poverty line.102 Not surprisingly, only
65.6% of this group receives first-trimester pre-natal care as contrasted
with about eighty-three percent for the rest of the population.10 3 Fe-
males under the age of eighteen, however, receive the least amount of
prenatal care; 48.5% receive first-trimester prenatal care; 12.7% receive
third-trimester care only; and some receive no care.10 4 In addition, the
percentage of female adolescents who receive third-trimester only or no
care is substantially higher for African-American and Hispanic adoles-
cents than for white adolescents. 10 5
99. Susheela Singh, Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, The Need for Prenatal Care in
the United States" Evidence from the 1980 National Natality Survey, 17 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 118, 118
(1985).
100. IZ at 119.
101. IRL
102. Id. at 120.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 121. One study estimates that 8.3% of white mothers receive third trimester-only
care or none whatsoever, whereas the statistic is 12.8% for African-American mothers and 11.9%
for Hispanic mothers. Id.
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the significance of age for Hispanic women.
Among Hispanic mothers, the incidence of inadequate care is nearly as high among 20-24 year-olds
(11%) as among adolescents (12%). (Inadequate care is defined as third trimester-only care, or none
at all.) For African-American women, however, there was a more marked difference between inade-
quate prenatal care for adolescents (12.8%) as compared with 20-24 year-olds (6.4%). For His-
panic mothers, then, the problem of inadequate prenatal care is prevalent irrespective of whether
they bear a child as adolescents or in their early 20s. There is no reason to single out pregnant,
Hispanic adolescents for special attention in terms of prenatal care; all pregnant, Hispanic women
under the age of 25 need to be targeted. We may have grown accustomed to talking about the
special problem of teenage pregnancy without understanding that, for some groups, age is not a
relevant variable. Not surprisingly, age is a significant variable for white women where the incidence
of inadequate prenatal care is 8.3% for adolescents and only 3.9% for 20-24 year olds. Finally, we
have to be careful not to talk about "women of color" generally with respect to prenatal care. The
only racial subgroups that are monitored closely are African-American and Hispanic women and,
for those two groups, the relationship between age and prenatal care differs. The evidence available
for other racial subgroups is lacking. Id
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The structure of the federal Medicaid program explains the unavail-
ability of prenatal care for certain groups in society. Eligibility for Medi-
caid is based on poverty and family structure. As of 1985, only one state,
Vermont, had an eligibility level that exceeded the federal poverty level
and twenty-three states had income limits that were less than half of the
federal poverty level. 1°6 If the new Medicaid rules are successful,
10 7
these figures should improve. In addition, prenatal care, delivery, and
postpartum care are not mandated under the Medicaid program. Two
states do not cover prescription drugs, five states do not cover clinics
(which are a major source of health care for poor women), twenty-seven
states do not cover diagnostic services, thirty-one states do not cover
screening services such as amniocentesis or ultrasound, and ten states
limit the number of outpatient visits below the number recommended for
an uncomplicated pregnancy.108 Only twelve states provide all of the
services under Medicaid that are considered part of an "adequate" prena-
tal health care system.1°9 Pregnant adolescents can have special
problems receiving Medicaid coverage because they often need to present
their parent's Medicaid card at the doctor's office to receive treatment. 110
Finally, it can be difficult to find a doctor who will accept Medicaid pay-
ment; a 1983 study indicated that only forty-six percent of obstetrician-
gynecologists in private practice accept Medicaid for a delivery."1
In sum, our prenatal care policies substantially harm the health and
well-being of fetuses, and poor, pregnant, teenage women. Unfortu-
nately, for poor, Hispanic women, escaping their teen years does not
make this problem diminish. We have consistently failed to spend suffi-
cient federal money to ensure a minimally healthy life for these women
and their children.
F. Abortion
Another way to avoid early childbirth stemming from unwanted
pregnancies is to have accessible abortion--especially at the early stages
of pregnancy when it is safest. But the Supreme Court has long sup-
ported restraints on abortions for adolescents. Moreover, the restrictions
106. Rachel Benson Gold & Asta Kenney, Paying for Maternity Care, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
103, 107 (1985).
107. See supra text accompanying note 88.
108. Rachel Benson Gold & Asta Kenney, supra note 106, at 108-09.
109. Id. at 109.
110. Id
111. Id See Margaret Terry Orr& Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, The Availability of Reproductive
Health Services from U.S. Private Physicians, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63, 67-68 (1985) ("substantial
proportions of physicians who provide reproductive health service are inaccessible to the poor, be-
cause they will not accept medicaid reimbursements.").
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approved in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 112 that increased
the costs of second trimester abortion and that made abortions unavaila-
ble in hospitals on public property will have a dramatic effect on adoles-
cents, because they are disproportionately affected by these measures.
Although adolescents manage to have abortions in relatively large num-
bers, they do so by overcoming substantial burdens that are placed in
their way. The consequence is that adolescents have disproportionately
late-term abortions, thereby increasing the health risks of the procedure
and raising its cost.
113
Despite parental consent laws and the unavailability of Medicaid for
abortions, about six percent of eighteen to nineteen year-olds had abor-
tions in 1981, the highest rate of any age group.114 Female adolescents
are the second most likely group to face a pregnancy, and the most likely
group to terminate it by abortion, despite the relative difficulty for many
of them to obtain an abortion.
115
The rate of abortions per 1000 women was much higher in 1981 for
non-white adolescents as compared to white adolescents (59.7 compared
with 33.5). However, the ratio of abortions per 100 abortions plus live
births was higher for white adolescents than non-white adolescents (41.8
compared with 39.6). These statistics reflect a much higher pregnancy
rate in the non-white community than the white community. Thus, in
absolute terms, non-white adolescents experienced many more abortions
and births than white adolescents, and were, overall, less likely to termi-
nate a pregnancy through abortion. Non-white adolescents are therefore
in much greater need of all reproductive health services than white
adolescents.
Adolescent females are disproportionately likely to have abortions
in the second trimester. In 1981, between six and eight percent of the
abortions performed on women over the age of twenty-five took place at
thirteen or more weeks gestation.1 6 In the same year for women under
the age of twenty, between ten and twenty-three percent of the abortions
performed took place at thirteen or more weeks' gestation, with the high-
112. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). For further discussion of the impact of this decision on female adoles-
cents, see Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William
L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.. 137, 175-78 (1990).
113. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2953-54 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
114. Stanley Henshaw, Nancy Binkin, Ellen Blaine & Jack Smith, A Portrait of American Wo-
men Who Obtain Abortions, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 90 (1985).
115. Id.




est statistic for women under the age of fourteen.1 17 There appears to be
an inverse, geometric relationship between age and second trimester
abortions for women under the age of twenty. Thus, when adolescent
females do face unintended pregnancies and decide to have an abortion,
they disproportionately face the high health risks of second trimester
abortions.1 18 Our silence about contraception and abortion may cause
them to risk their lives and health in order to obtain an abortion.
More recent statistics depict a similar trend, although the overall
number of abortions may be declining. In 1984, 1,333,521 legal abor-
tions were performed; five percent more than the number reported for
the previous year.119 In 1985, the number decreased to 1,328,570, a re-
duction of less than one percent.1 20 The abortion ratio was highest for
women under fifteen years of age and second highest for fifteen to
nineteen years of age.' 21 In 1984 and 1985, adolescents had twenty-six
percent of all legal abortions. Of the abortions performed at sixteen to
twenty weeks gestation, 37.1% were performed on fifteen to nineteen
year-olds in 1985, although that group generally comprised only twenty-
five percent of all abortions. For abortions past twenty-one weeks, the
same trend continues. Of all post-twenty-one-week abortions, 36.7%
were performed on fifteen to nineteen year-olds.1 22 Other than females
under the age of fifteen, who have only one percent of all abortions, no
other group disproportionately had post-sixteen-week abortions.1 23 Even
women over the age of thirty-five who might discover that their fetus was
handicapped late in the pregnancy were most likely to have abortions in
the first ten weeks of pregnancy.1 24 Non-white women also were dispro-
portionately likely to have post-eleven week abortions. For example,
although they generally comprised 32.7% of the women having abor-
tions, they comprised 44.7% and 41.3% of the women having sixteen-to-
twenty-week and post-twenty-one-week abortions, respectively. 125
Abortion mortality statistics show a steady decline since abortion
was legalized. In 1972, ninety women died as a result of abortion, with
forty-three percent of those deaths (thirty-nine women) dying as a result
117. Id.
118. Id. at 262-63.
119. Abortion Surveillance. Preliminary Analysis--United States 1986 and 1987, 38 MORBIDITY
& MORTALTY WEEKLY REP. 662, 663 (1989).
120. Id.




125. Id Preliminary statistics for 1986 and 1987 show a similar pattern of abortions by race,
age, and gestation. Id
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of an illegal abortion. By contrast, in 1984, eighteen women died as a
result of an abortion, eleven of which died from a legally induced abor-
tion, six from a spontaneous abortion. 126
All of the previously cited abortion studies indicate how many ado-
lescents procure abortions and mortality rates from abortions. Only one
study that I have found, however, analyzes the short-term and long-term
consequences for adolescents who procure abortions as compared with
pregnant adolescents who bear the child and care for it or relinquish it
for adoption. One study sought to determine if the young women (360
African-American teenage women of similar socioeconomic backgrounds
who sought pregnancy tests from two Baltimore reproductive health
providers) who terminated their pregnancies fared differently than the
women who carried their pregnancies to term. 127 In terms of educational
status, the study found that the women who carried their pregnancies to
term attained significantly less education. Interestingly, the difference
became more significant over the two year period of the study. 128 This
negative change in their educational experience was not consistent with
their educational expectations, as expressed during interviews. As for
economic well-being, the abortion group's economic status improved
over the two year period, while at the same time the child bearer's eco-
nomic well-being deteriorated. Even when the effect of the presence of
the baby was removed from the calculation of household income, the
abortion group performed significantly better than the child bearing
group.12 9 An investigation of the psychological profiles of the abortion
and childbearing groups showed no significant differences; the only sig-
nificant factor that was found was a relationship between self-esteem and
educational expectations. 130 Finally, no significant results were found in
contraception use or subsequent pregnancy based on whether the women
aborted or carried their pregnancies to term. A somewhat higher per-
centage of the women who had an abortion (76.9% as compared with
68.2%) reported using contraceptives always or most of the time, but a
somewhat higher percentage of the women who had an abortion (57.5%
as compared with 54.5%) had a subsequent pregnancy within two years
of the first pregnancy. 131 In interpreting these statistics, however, one
has to remember that the women who carried the pregnancy to term
126. Ma
127. Laurie Schwab Zabin, Marilyn Hirsch & Mark Emerson, When Urban Adolescents Choose
Abortion: Effects on Education, Psychological Status and Subsequent Pregnancy, 21 FAM. PLAN.
PERPs. 248, 248 (1989).
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id at 251.
130. Id at 252.
131. Id at 253 (Table 6).
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were at risk of pregnancy for a much smaller portion of the two years of
the study than the women who had abortions.
This study confirms my initial thesis: Pregnancy, in itself, need not
be a problem for adolescents. The pregnancy becomes problematic due
to the socially created, negative life consequences of carrying the preg-
nancy to term and the high possibility of another unintended pregnancy,
which also may be carried to term. Adolescent women who procure an
abortion will, on average, fare better than their peers who bear the child.
However, both sets of adolescents remain at high risk of undergoing an-
other unintended pregnancy with subsequent child care responsibilities.
By putting substantial obstacles in the path of adolescents who want
abortions, we cause them to delay their abortion and thereby undergo
significant health risks. In contrast, by facilitating their ability to pro-
cure an abortion, we may improve the quality of their lives as well as the
lives of their future children.
G. Adoption
Another way to avoid the consequences of early childbirth is to
make adoption an easily-available option. Adoption, however, is not
considered to be an acceptable alternative by most pregnant women, and
especially by pregnant African-American or Hispanic women.
1. Frequency of Adoption by Race. Information on adoption is
limited 132 and the statistics that do exist are difficult to understand. The
federal government stopped compiling national adoption statistics in
1975.133 Statistics from the 1980s suggest that despite the public empha-
sis on the adoptability of all children, adoptions may have declined dur-
ing the mid-1980s.134 Most of the decline in adoption appears to have
taken place among white women. For adoptions of unrelated children,
the white rate fell from 1.9% in 1982 to 1.4% in 1987; the rate for Afri-
can-American women fell from 0.9% in 1982 to 0.8% in 1987; the rate
for Hispanic women increased from 0.2% in 1982 to 0.4% in 1987.135
Although the rate of adoption among Hispanic women is not declining
132. Christine Bachrach, Patricia Adams, Soledad Sambrano & Kathryn London, Adoption in
the 1980'; 181 ADVANCE DATA 1 (January 5, 1990) (reporting that the federal government only
began collecting information, and then only on a voluntary basis, in 1982).
133. Unmarried White Women Are Those Most Likely to Place Children for Adoption, NSFG
Data Show, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 29 (1987) (data obtained from Christine Bachrach, Adoption
Plans Adopted Children, and Adoptive Mothers; 48 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 246 (1986)) [hereinafter
Unmarried White Women].
134. Christine Bachrach et al., supra note 132, at 1-3 (declining from 2.2% of all ever-married
women 20-44 years of age in 1982 to 1.7% in 1987; declining for adopting an unrelated child from
1.7% in 1982 to 1.3% in 1987).
135. Id at 3.
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and the African-American level is relatively constant, the absolute num-
bers of African-American and Hispanic women who adopt unrelated
children is much lower than the rate for white women. Because interra-
cial adoptions constitute only about eight percent of all adoptions and
those adoptions consist primarily of the adoption of children of races
other than African-American or white by white adoptive mothers, 136 Af-
rican-American and Hispanic children have a much lower likelihood of
being adopted than do white children. In 1987, eighty-seven percent of
the mothers who adopted were white, seven percent were African-Ameri-
can, and about two percent were Hispanic. The adoptive mother and
child are of the same race 92.4% of the time.137 Given that the preg-
nancy rate among African-American and Hispanic women is higher than
that among white women, one could infer that adoption is not a viable
option, other than with relatives, in the African-American and Hispanic
communities. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the number of
unadoptable African-American and Hispanic children.
The women who place their children for adoption are not the most
disadvantaged women in society. "Babies born to single white women
were much more likely to have been placed for adoption (12 percent)
than were those born to single [African-American] women (less than one
percent) in 1982." 138 Of the white women who did place their child for
adoption, they were three times more likely to have had fathers who had
some college education than women who kept their babies. 139 Single wo-
men who had placed their children for adoption were less likely to be
receiving public assistance, less likely to be poor, and more likely to have
completed high school than were single women who kept their babies.140
Thus, adoption is not a realistic solution to pregnancy for the most disad-
vantaged, pregnant, single women.'
41
2. Consequences of Adoption. The Antiabortion movement con-
siders adoption to be the panacea for the need for abortion. 42 Few stud-
ies, however, compare the consequences for adolescents based on
whether they abort, raise the child themselves, or relinquish the child for
136. IaL at 1-2.
137. Id at 5.
138. Unmarried White Women, supra note 133, at 29.
139. Id
140. Id
141. Eleanor Smeal, President of the Feminist Majority, has suggested to me that society deliber-
ately limits abortions for adolescents so that some white adolescents will "choose" to relinquish their
children for adoption rather than obtain an abortion. The fact that both abortion and adoption are
relatively unavailable for non-white women is of little concern to people who profit from adoptions.
142. See, eg., Newsday, Jan. 1990, at 5 (President Bush noting "the self-evident moral superior-
ity of adoption over abortion").
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adoption. One study has compared these latter two alternatives, but has
not compared either of these two groups to women who abort an unin-
tended pregnancy. 143 Despite the fact that women who relinquish their
children for adoption would seem to face fewer financial, emotional, and
child-care demands than those who raise their children, previous studies
had suggested that there are significant negative psychological conse-
quences stemming from the relinquishment decision.144 Nevertheless,
one recent study found that relinquishers are generally more successful
than child rearers in terms of completing vocational training, delaying
marriage, avoiding a rapid subsequent pregnancy, working following the
birth of the child, and living in a higher income household. 145 As com-
pared with adolescents who do not bear a child, however, both relin-
quishers and child rearers attain lower socioeconomic status. 146 These
authors were not able to confirm that relinquishers suffer deleterious so-
cial or psychological consequences as compared with nonrelinquishers.
However, their findings do not provide much evidence as to how relin-
quishers compare with women who choose abortion.
H. Conclusion
Early childbirth has substantial negative health effects on adolescent
mothers, including a higher mortality and morbidity rate than for older
women. The cause of these adverse health effects appears to be inade-
quate prenatal care, because there is no physical reason why women be-
tween the ages of fifteen and nineteen should face more difficult
pregnancies than older women. Countries that have instituted a success-
ful state-funded prenatal care system have been able to avoid these ad-
verse health consequences.
Early childbirth also impacts substantially on a woman's educa-
tional opportunities. African-American and Hispanic women are gener-
ally less likely to graduate from high school than white women; early
childbirth compounds this problem. Federal policy appears to have as-
sisted white pregnant women to stay in school. However, it appears to
143. Steven McLaughlin, Diane Manninen & Linda Winges, Do Adolescents Who Relinquish
Their Children Fare Better or Worse Than Those Who Raise Them?, 20 FAm. PLAN. PERsp. 25
(1988) (study group consisted of 123 adolescents who kept their child and 146 who relinquished
their child).
144. Id at 25.
145. Id at 32.
146. Id The study is imprecise on this point. At one point, it compares these two groups with
their "never-pregnant peers" and at another point compares them with adolescents who "avoid a
birth." Id Clearly, adolescents who have an abortion have been pregnant but have not given birth
to child. I have assumed for this discussion that they meant to refer to adolescents who have not had
a child rather than adolescents who have never been pregnant.
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have been rather ineffectual in assisting African-American and Hispanic
women to stay in school. In monitoring our progress in this area, it is
not sufficient to look at the overall statistics for adolescents and be satis-
fied; we need to examine each subgroup and see that virtually no progress
has occurred for African-American and Hispanic adolescents even if the
general statistics have improved due to the large numbers of white
women.
In addition, early childbirth dramatically impacts on the well-being
of the child born. Inadequate prenatal care is a major factor causing
both prematurity and low birth weight. Race correlates with low birth
weight. The relative risk of low birth weight for African-American chil-
dren is more than twice as high as for a comparable group of white chil-
dren, with the difference increasing over time. African-American
children, unfortunately, appear to have a disproportionately higher mor-
tality rate even when they have normal birth weights, meaning that we
really need to target the health care needs of African-American children.
In quantitative terms, nearly 20,000 African-American infants died in
the first year of life over the last five years who would not have died had
their chances for health care been equal to that of white infants. It also
appears to be the case that avoiding teenage pregnancies is not going to
solve the health problems for African-American children. It appears
that the problems of low birth weight and high mortality exist among all
African-American children irrespective of the age of their mothers.
Despite the clear need for effective sex education, contraception,
availability of abortion, prenatal care, and adoption services, Congress
and many of the states do very little to achieve these goals. They con-
tinue to promote childbirth by curtailing contraception, sex education,
and abortion services for adolescents and by not improving the quality of
prenatal care. They speak in the negative-limiting access to certain re-
productive health services-but do not take any affirmative steps to en-
courage real family planning among adolescents. The results are the
high rates of unintended teenage pregnancies that have been described
above. In the next section, I discuss legal strategies to make Congress
and the states act more responsibly with respect to reproductive health
issues.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction
The previous sections have demonstrated that our reproductive
health policies act coercively in the lives of adolescent females in a way
that is detrimental to their health and well-being, as well as to the health
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and well-being of their fetus and future children. In this section, I argue
that such appalling disrespect for the lives and well-being of adolescent
females and their future offspring violates the equal protection clause.
Unfortunately, in recent years the courts have consistently ruled that
such actions do not violate either the equal protection or due process
clauses.
The recent case of Hodgson v. Minnesota 147 highlights the need to
protect female adolescents from coercive state policies, as well as the dif-
ficulty of obtaining such protection under contemporary legal doctrine.
In that case, Minnesota largely succeeded in creating a public policy that
favors childbirth over abortion through a two-parent notification require-
ment with judicial bypass, ignoring entirely the dramatic negative conse-
quences of such a policy on the lives of female adolescents and their
future offspring.1 48 The primary interests that the Minnesota claimed to
be considering by enacting the law were the interests of the parents of the
pregnant adolescent and the family unit comprised of the pregnant ado-
lescent and her parents-Minnesota did not maintain that the adoles-
cent's self-perceived best interests should control.1 49 Although the
federal district court had concluded that one major motivation behind
the parental notification statute had been to favor childbirth over abor-
tion, the state did not even attempt to argue in favor of this policy before
the Supreme Court because it understood that such a policy choice did
not further the well-being of the pregnant adolescent. 150 My argument,
under the equal protection clause, is that states should be required to
147. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
148. The Supreme Court held that the two-parent notification requirement was constitutional as
long as ajudicial bypass procedure existed. Id at 2950-51, 2969-71. Female adolescents are there-
fore burdened by notifying both parents or undergoing a court procedure-both forms of intrusion
will cause many adolescents to delay or to refrain from obtaining an abortion, despite the fact that
the pregnancy is unintended and unwanted. What I find puzzling about the Court's ruling is that the
Court apparently ruled that a judicial bypass-which itself is burdensome, stressful, and not guaran-
teed to yield a positive result for the petitioner---can undo the unconstitutionality of the two-parent
notification requirement. Five members oF the Court (Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan, O'Connor, and
Marshall) concluded that a two-parent notification requirement infringed adolescents' liberty inter-
ests and served no legitimate public purpose, but somehow, five members of the Court (Kennedy,
Scalia, O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist) ruled that the availability of a judicial bypass procedure
could justify the two-parent notification requirement. Id at 2945-47, 2950-51, 2969-71. Such an
illogical result is possible, I would argue, under a judicial framework that largely disregards the well-
being of pregnant adolescents when rendering its decisions. (For example, I would like to see a study
presented to the Court that documents the negative health consequences to pregnant adolescents of
undergoing the highly stressful experience of appearing before a judge or notifying an abusive, absent
parent. It is hard to believe that such extreme stress could be healthy for the adolescent's pregnancy
or subsequent abortion.)
149. Id. at 2941-44.
150. Id. at 2937 (noting that the state "affirmatively disavow[ed]... state interest as a basis for
upholding the law").
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consider the impact of their policies on the lives and well-being of preg-
nant adolescents. They should not be allowed to assert alternative, weak
considerations about the supposed well-being of others without first ac-
counting for the impact of their policies on pregnant adolescents (i.e., the
people upon whom the law has the most direct and drastic impact). The
states should be forced to justify how they could favor coerced childbirth
over abortion given the enormous negative implications of that coerced
childbirth in the lives of the pregnant woman, the fetus she currently
carries, and her present and future offspring.
Although Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority in Hodgson, did
conclude that the two-parent notification without judicial bypass was un-
constitutional, he did so without serious consideration of the impact of
coerced pregnancies on the lives of pregnant adolescents and the children
born to them. He simply refuted the state's assertions about the parents'
interests being served by the forced two-parent notification procedure.
He did not find fault with the state for admittedly not making the well-
being of adolescents a prime consideration. Under my proposed analysis,
the impact on the pregnant adolescents would be the focus of the analysis
under heightened scrutiny rather than a side issue that is easily ignored
while "parents rights" (without responsibilities) are discussed. 151 As I
discuss, this proposed analysis conflicts with several of the Supreme
Court's major holdings; I therefore suggest arguments to modify those
decisions.
B. Doctrinal Advantages of Equal Protection Doctrine
Traditionally, the courts have used a privacy framework to resolve
abortion cases. (That is the framework used in Hodgson.) In Roe v.
Wade, 15 2 the Supreme Court found that the right of privacy was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." 153 The Court did not find an absolute right of privacy,
but rather held that the right of privacy should be "considered against
imporbant state interests in regulation."1 54 In the fifteen years that fol-
151. Ironically, pregnant adolescents are themselves potential parents but receive no respect by
the state for that potential parenthood (although the state does prefer to refer to the pregnant adoles-
cent as a "mother" during the course of her pregnancy). If the state really viewed the fetus inside
the pregnant woman as a child then it would have had to give the pregnant adolescent as much
respect, as a parent, as it gave the parents of the pregnant adolescent.
152. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153. IM. at 153.
154. Id. at 154. In other cases, the Court has required the state to present "compelling" reasons
for abortion restrictions. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427
(1983) ("restrictive state regulation of the right to choose on abortion... must be supported by a
compelling state interest").
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lowed, the Court applied this framework to invalidate nearly all restric-
tions against abortion except: (1) Congressional and state limitations on
Medicaid that made it very difficult for poor people to obtain govern-
ment-funded abortions,155 and (2) parental consent and notification stat-
utes that made it difficult for adolescents to preserve their privacy and
obtain expeditious abortions. 156 Many feminists criticized the Court's
privacy approach, because it could not protect the most disadvantaged
women from coercive anti-abortion regulations. Concurrently, they have
credited the privacy framework as being more rigorous than the interme-
diate scrutiny standard applied to sex-based equal protection claims. 157
In addition, feminist pro-choice litigators have continued to use the
privacy approach because of doctrinal problems with the equal protec-
tion approach. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that discrimi-
nation against pregnant women constitutes per se sex-based intentional
discrimination.15 8 An argument that a pregnancy-related distinction
constituted intentional sex-based discrimination would therefore have to
meet the difficult standard of proof for intentional discrimination as set
forth in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney. 159 In Feeney, the Supreme
Court held that the discriminatory purpose test, which applies to facially
neutral policies that produce a disparate impact on the basis of gender,
requires that the institution "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." 16° This test has proved almost im-
possible to meet; thus, attempts to meet this standard in cases involving
abortion-related restrictions have failed.1 61
Nevertheless, the privacy approach is no longer superior to the
equal protection approach. Although the Supreme Court denies that it
has modified the Roe framework, it has watered down the privacy stan-
155. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (a woman's freedom of choice does not include
an entitlement to the financial resources necessary to exercise that choice; thus, the Hyde Amend-
ment limitation on the subsidization of certain medically necessary abortion is constitutional).
156. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) ("parental notice and consent typically may
be imposed by the state on a minor's right to make important decisions," including abortion).
157. See, e.g., Sarah Bums, supra note 2, at 200-01 (recognizing the distinction between the
intermediate scrutiny standard and the strict scrutiny standard that is applied in the fundamental
rights context, which includes privacy).
158. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974) (state's decision to exclude pregnancy
from coverage under its disability insurance program is not an invidious discrimination violation of
the Equal Protection clause).
159. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
160. Id at 279.
161. See eg., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-27 (1980) (failed attempt to prove a violation
of equal protection rights of poor women). For an excellent critique of the Feeney standard, see
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact" An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1376 (1979).
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dard by suggesting that the state need assert only a "legitimate" interest
to sustain an abortion-related restriction. 162 This standard is less rigor-
ous than the "compelling" state interest standard used under Roe as well
as the "important" state interest standard required under intermediate
scrutiny for sex-based equal protection cases. Given the controversial
nature of privacy doctrine, the development of equal protection doctrine
might be politically and legally advantageous.
C. A Proposed Equal Protection Framework
There are two major doctrinal difficulties in trying to apply current
equal protection doctrine to reproductive health issues: (1) the Geduldig
v. Aiello 163 holding that pregnancy is not a sex-based condition, and (2)
the Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 164 holding that purposeful dis-
crimination must be established by proving that a legislature acted "be-
cause of" its desire to harm women rather than "in spite of" this desire.
Although these doctrinal difficulties are enormous, they can be overcome
without revolutionizing equal protection doctrine.
Proof of gender-based discrimination can take two forms. A plain-
tiff can establish that a defendant has instituted a policy that facially cre-
ates a gender-based distinction. In such a case, the Court presumes that
the action was intentional and therefore concludes that the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. 165 The
case then goes to the justificatory stage in which the Court assesses the
importance of the state's objective and the relationship between the
means chosen and that objective. Alternatively, a plaintiff can establish
that a defendant has instituted a gender-neutral policy that creates a dis-
parate impact based on sex. In such a case, she can only establish a
prima facie case of discrimination if she also demonstrates that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex.' 66 Thus, when a
female plaintiff desires to challenge a state's reproductive health policies,
she has the option of (1) establishing that the policy is explicitly sex-
based and therefore is a presumptive example of intentional sex-based
discrimination, or (2) that the policy is gender-neutral but creates a dis-
parate impact on the basis of sex that can be categorized as "intentional."
162. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989).
163. 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
164. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
165. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1973) (striking down a statutory
presumption that female spouses of military personnel are dependents whereas male spouses are
not).
166. See, eg., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80 (upholding statute that created a sex-based disparate
impact because no proof of intentional discrimination was established).
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The stumbling block to the first strategy is Geduldig. In Geduldig,
the Court found that pregnancy is not a sex-based condition and there-
fore did not apply heightened scrutiny to a case involving a pregnancy-
based exclusion from disability insurance. 167 Because, in the Court's
opinion, the case did not present an example of sex discrimination (or
any other suspect class of discrimination), it considered minimal rational
basis scrutiny to be appropriate. 168 Under this lenient standard, the
Court held that the state's economic arguments for excluding pregnancy
from its disability insurance were a sufficient justification. 169
The stumbling block for the second strategy is Feeney. In Feeney,
the Court clarified that the intent standard could only be met with evi-
dence that the legislature enacted its policy because it desired to harm
women rather than in spite of such a desire. 170 Thus, the fact that the
Massachusetts Legislature precluded ninety-eight percent of women
from obtaining civil service jobs through its veteran's preference statute
was not sufficient evidence to warrant heightened scrutiny because that
action was not instituted for the purpose of harming women; the legisla-
ture did not seriously contemplate the impact on women when it passed
and maintained its veteran's preference.1 71
Feminist critiques of the Court's decisions concerning reproductive
health have largely focused on Geduldig rather than Feeney. They have
criticized Geduldig by focusing on the absurdity of the Court's conclu-
sion that pregnancy is not a sex-based condition. 172 They have argued
that it is ridiculous to suggest that a legislature is unaware that preg-
nancy-related restrictions adversely affect women, and not men, because
everyone knows that only women can become pregnant.
These critiques of Geduldig have been unsuccessful, in part, because
they misunderstand the Court's reluctance to extend heightened scrutiny
to pregnancy-related distinctions. I understand the Court to be saying
that pregnancy-related restrictions are not first-order sex-based equal
protection problems because they are based on a real physical difference
between men and women. Consistent with that view, the Court has been
reluctant to use heightened scrutiny in cases relating to women's
"rapability" or ability to become pregnant during teenage sex.173 In the
167. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
168. Id. at 494-95.
169. Id. at 496.
170. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 276.
171. Id. at 279-81.
172. See generally Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955,
983 (1984) (describing the numerous criticisms of Geduldig as a "cottage industry").
173. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-73 (1981) (upholding state statutory
rape law in which only the male participant in the sexual act is criminally liable, because the statute
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Court's view, these kinds of distinctions are less problematic than nonbi-
ological restrictions on women and therefore deserve lower scrutiny. The
Court's persistent use of a low level of scrutiny in biologically-based
equal protection claims is consistent with its movement toward a low
level of scrutiny in pregnancy-related privacy cases. The Court simply
does not see those biologically-based restrictions as, in Justice
O'Connor's words, "unduly burden[ing]" women's lives.174
I propose two strategies to overcome this trend. First, feminists
should attack the Feeney test for how to prove purposeful discrimination
rather than the Geduldig holding itself. If we can meet the standard set
forth in Feeney (or a modified version of it), we would not have to win
under Geduldig. Second, feminists should present the record of the sys-
tematic disadvantage of women through increased use of the reproduc-
tive health literature. We may not ultimately persuade the Court that all
pregnancy-related restrictions disadvantage women's lives in a dramatic
way; however, by focusing on the literature concerning female adoles-
cents, we may be able to make the Court see that many of these restric-
tions dramatically disadvantage female adolescents. Under privacy
doctrine, female adolescents have received a lower level of scrutiny than
adult women because of the courts' deference to parents under privacy
doctrine. 175 I believe that an equal protection approach can demonstrate
that pregnant female adolescents are, in fact, the group most in need of
heightened scrutiny because the sphere of family-related privacy, coupled
with legislative insensitivity, has caused them to be a highly disadvan-
taged and politically powerless group.
Turning to the first strategy, the facts in Feeney exemplify the unsat-
isfactory nature of the "but for" causation requirement. Feeney involved
the constitutionality of a lifetime veteran's preference statute. Because
the statute was written in terms of "veterans" and "nonveterans," the
Court considered it to be gender neutral. Nevertheless, the facially neu-
tral statute produced a disparate gender-based impact. Thus, the Court
inquired as to whether the impact was "intentional." The veteran's pref-
erence was enacted before women were eligible for most civil service
is designed to prevent illegitimate adolescent pregnancies); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
332-37 (1977) (upholding a state regulation explicitly preventing women from serving as guards in
"contact" positions in state penitentiaries, as "[t]he likelihood that inmates would assault a woman
because she was a woman would pose a real threat... [to the] control of the penitentiary").
174. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979) (permitting state to require parental con-
sultation in the abortion decision). As Justice O'Connor has explained, the Court has extended the
liberty interest to choose an abortion to adolescents but with some "important limitations." Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2949 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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jobs. 176 The Massachusetts legislature did not enact the veteran's prefer-
ence statute to harm women because its original enactment had little to
do with women. Thus, showing a discriminatory intent was impossible.
The original enactment gave one group of men preference over another
group of men, because job classifications were generally sex-segregated.
The preference, however, was maintained in the early 1970s, after civil
service jobs were no longer officially sex-segregated. Since ninety-eight
percent of veterans were men, the preference served to exclude women
from nearly all jobs open to the preference on a lifetime basis, even after
the sex-segregation rules were lifted. 177
The fact that the legislature never consciously considered how the
classification would affect women, once women became eligible to com-
pete against men for most civil service employment, should not be an
acceptable defense. We should insist that legislatures wrestle with a stat-
ute's impact on women. Thus, the appropriate doctrinal question should
be whether a legislature would have been willing to impose these kinds of
burdens on women if it fully considered their well-being. Would it be
willing to exclude all men from civil service jobs to benefit a subcategory
of women? 1
78
By formulating a narrow intent test, the Court failed to ask the
questions that are likely to go to the core of women's equal protection
problems. Legislatures are more likely to act on the basis of patronizing
stereotypes about white, middle-class, adult women's 179 best interests
than on the basis of an intention to discriminate against women. Alter-
natively, legislatures are likely to ignore all women's interests altogether
and thereby act to preserve the status quo of unequal opportunity be-
176. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256 (noting that single-sex hiring was explicitly authorized under
the 1884 Civil Service statute, which predated the Veteran's Preference statute). This practice was
apparently not officially eliminated until 1971, when Massachusetts required that single-sex exami-
nations receive the prior approval of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Id. at
266 n.14.
177. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270 (noting that only 1.8% of women who were hired by Civil
Service were veterans).
178. I find it ironic that the Court can uphold a lifetime veteran's preference for men in Feeney
while overturning limited preferences for African-Americans and women in other cases. The fact
that the Court will rarely approve affirmative action for women, and then only when it is of a limited
duration, suggests that society is not willing to place the kinds of burdens on men that it is willing to
place on women. Women are asked to give up all hopes of procuring decent civil service jobs,
whereas men are not asked to step aside for even a brief period of time to help women advance in the
workplace. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989) (creat-
ing very rigid rules for affirmative action plans).
179. I say "white, middle-class, adult women" because I think that this is the group of women
considered by legislators, if they consider women at all. Legislators have rarely had positive or
patronizing stereotypes of African-American or poor women.
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tween men and women. 180 An unthinking attitude can be as harmful to
women as direct animus, because it serves to keep women's interests in
society invisible. The "but for" causation requirement of Feeney gives a
legislature the incentive to say nothing about women's interests when
enacting legislation, making it all but impossible to prove discriminatory
intent. Such silence, however, should not be the goal of the equal protec-
tion clause. A full and considered legislative debate should be the goal of
the equal protection clause. The intent test encourages legislatures to be
unthinking with reference to women's liberty interests.
Thus, I suggests that the Court continue to insist that discrimina-
tory intent be established when a state develops a facially neutral statute
that disproportionately impacts women. However, the definition of "in-
tent" does not have to be the narrow definition utilized in Feeney. A
legislature, for example, could be considered to have an unconstitutional
state of mind (or "intent") when it entirely ignores a statute's impact on
women, and imposes burdens on women that it would not be willing to
impose on men. If equal protection doctrine is truly designed to "pro-
tect" women and men equally then the Court should not tolerate con-
scious blindness to women's needs, interests, and well-being. Clearly, the
definition of intent that I suggest is not the one currently used by the
Court; however, careful consideration of how it is that legislatures are
most likely to discriminate against women makes such a test appropriate.
Permitting legislatures to burden women through legislative oversight
should not be tolerated, yet that kind of oversight is exactly what Feeney
encourages.
Returning to the thesis of this Essay-the example of female adoles-
cents-I believe that it should be sufficient to present the following two-
step analysis in order to show a gender-based violation of equal protec-
tion. First, using the empirical evidence that I have described above, we
would show that our current reproductive health policies have a dispa-
180. Feminists provide a twofold description of women's subordinate status. First, feminists
argue that women's needs and burdens are not fully understood; women are often silent, not heard,
or not considered. See generally TILLIE OLSEN, SILENCES (1978); ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES
SECRETS AND SILENCE (1979). Second, feminists argue that when men observe women they often
do not see women as whole persons; they do not respect women. This is often called a problem of
"sexual objectification." See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIs-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). Men may love women yet may treat women as sexual objects
for their sexual pleasure. Men may value women's ability to bear children yet may use that biologi-
cal ability as a reason to preclude women from a range of work outside the home. As Justice Bren-
nan once commented, the pedestal can be a cage. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
Justice Brennan was probably thinking of white, middle-class women because, for poor women,
there is only a cage. For all women, however, to varying degrees, it is a cage of limited opportunity
where women's needs are not fully understood and women are not given the opportunity to achieve
their full potential.
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rate impact against female adolescents. Because all of the individuals in
that category are female, we would argue that we had shown that a
facially neutral policy produced a gender-based disparate impact. Sec-
ond, using my modified Feeney test, we would argue that a legislature
that respected the well-being of female adolescents would not have
passed the legislation in question. Because female adolescents are often
poor and do not necessarily have the right to vote, they are especially
deserving of the Court's protection.181 It is difficult to imagine that legis-
latures would deliberately want to harm female adolescents; however, if
their blindness to the effects of their policies on this group is causing
enormous disadvantages for this group, then the equal protection clause
mandates that the Court intercede.
182
Having described the best equal protection argument that I can
make on behalf of female adolescents, I also would like to note one theo-
retical difficulty with this approach. The empirical literature that I have
presented shows that our reproductive health policies impact female ado-
lescents differently depending upon their class and race. Our adoption
policies, for example, may disfavor African-American and Hispanic wo-
men while favoring some poor Caucasian women and disfavoring other
poor Caucasian women. Our prenatal policies may disfavor all poor fe-
male adolescents, but they especially disfavor poor, African-American
women. Equal protection doctrine, however, forces us to generalize to
181. Persons under the age of 18 do not have the right to vote. Although 46% of the population
eligible to vote did so in 1986, only 18.6% of persons, age 18-20, did vote. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN AMERICA: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK 189 (A. Garwood ed. 1988).
182. This view is similar to the general perspective articulated by John Hart Ely. See JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 135-70 (1980) (courts
should protect constitutional rights irrespective of why they are denied, and should also strive to
protect politically weak minorities where legislative action is harmful to such minorities).
Unfortunately, even if I could persuade the Court to modify the Feeney test, as I have sug-
gested, one major doctrinal problem might remain. In equal protection analysis, we are accustomed
to talking about the impact of a policy on one particular subgroup that receives close scrutiny by the
courts such as African-Americans or women. The Supreme Court has refused to use close scrutiny
in analyzing the impact of restrictive abortion policies on a subgroup of women-poor, minority
women. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-26 (1980) (applying a rational relationship test, as
there was no suspect classification, and rejecting an equal protection claim by poor, minority wo-
men). In the Title VII context, some courts have recognized that it is unlawful to have combined
categories, such as African-American women, face different treatment; nevertheless, the courts have
never defined a subclass on the basis of class, race, and sex terms. See, eg., Jefferies v. Harris
County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing the Title VII
forbids race or sex discrimination, which includes discrimination based on a combination of those
categories). Moreover, the recognition that African-American women constitute a protected class
has not been broadly utilized under Title VII, nor has it been introduced into equal protection
doctrine. It is important for this concept of combined categories to be introduced into equal protec-
tion doctrine in order for legal doctrine to be sensitive to the essentialism critique. For further
discussion of the importance of recognizing combined categories, see Note, Invisible Man: Black
and Male Under Title VII, 104 HARV. L. REv. 749 (1991).
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categories that are recognized as suspect classes such as gender or race
and forces us to ignore categories that are not recognized as suspect such
as class. Thus, I could have easily described the impact of our reproduc-
tive health policies in class terms as in gender terms, but our equal pro-
tection doctrine requires me to choose the latter rather than the former.
More importantly, however, equal protection doctrine forces us to gener-
alize into broad categories such as gender rather than specify the range of
difference within each category.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the essentialism critique forces us
to dispense with all group-based legal arguments. The fact that the im-
pact of our reproductive health policies differs on the basis of race and
class does not take away from the fact that every individual who is di-
rectly impacted by these policies is also female. The essentialism critique
does not make feminism meaningless by eliminating our ability to talk
about gender. It simply makes feminism more complicated by insisting
that we understand the diversity of experiences within the category of
female. Thus, in this Essay, I have tried to focus on adolescent females-
a group that is generally ignored in our discussions of reproductive
health policies. Rather than have white, middle-class, adult women be
the paradigm when reproductive health policies are discussed, I have
tried to bring poor female adolescents to the forefront and to propose an
equal protection doctrine that is sensitive to their experiences. That goal,
I believe, is central to the anti-essentialism project even if it must retain
some elements of essentialism to satisfy the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have argued that pregnant adolescents deserve the
highest level of judicial protection when the federal government or states
create reproductive health policies that favor childbirth over sex educa-
tion, contraception, abortion, or adoption. Because of the extensive rec-
ord of society coercing pregnant adolescents to undergo childbirth,
despite the dramatic negative consequences of such childbirth on the
lives of the pregnant adolescents as well as her future offspring, this
group is deserving of treatment as a "suspect class." Moreover, their
political powerlessness, as evidenced by their legal inability to vote and
their low voting turnout when they can vote, contributes to their entitle-
ment to suspect class treatment.
A legislature's ignorance of the impact of its policies should be no
defense to an equal protection challenge; rather, we should insist that
legislatures protect the most disadvantaged groups in society by being
aware of the impact of their policies on them. If legislatures would open
their eyes to the impact of their reproductive health policies on female
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adolescents, they would see that nearly ten percent of female adolescents
face unintended pregnancies and that three-fourths of those women do
not have access to contraceptives. Overall, one million female adoles-
cents become pregnant each year; although more than three-fourths of
those pregnancies were unintended, nearly half of those pregnancies re-
sult in the birth of a child. Thus, approximately one million female ado-
lescents need to be reached through effective reproductive health policies
so that their pregnancies can be intended and wanted.
The courts should monitor Congress and the states closely to ensure
that the legislatures reverse their despicable record on reproductive
health issues. The legislatures need to be made aware of the kinds of
statistics I have cited in this Essay and urged to take positive, responsible
steps rather than blindly encouraging childbirth among the group that
can ill afford unintended and unwanted pregnancies. It should no longer
be possible for legislatures to say blithely that they favor childbirth over
contraception, sex education, and abortion, or to ignore entirely the im-
pact of their policies on pregnant adolescents to favor restrictive repro-
ductive health practices. They must be made to account for the ways
that their irresponsible attitudes dramatically harm pregnant, female ad-
olescents and their offspring.
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